We consider a stochastic inventory control problem in which a buyer makes procurement decisions while facing periodic random demand and two supply sources, namely, a long-term contract supplier and a spot market. The contract between the buyer and the supplier partially shields the latter from the vicissitudes of the spot market, in that the price paid by the buyer to the supplier is only partially linked to the spot price at the moment. After fulfilling the minimum-order commitment with the supplier, the buyer has the full freedom to source from both the supplier and the market. Procurement from the spot market also incurs a fixed setup cost. We show that an optimal policy consists of three different policy forms, with the realization of each depending on the buyer's inventory level and the prevalent spot price. Certain conditions are identified under which monotone trends exist between policy parameters and the current spot price.
Introduction
Procurement and inventory management are two essential functions that greatly impact a company's profitability and thus are critical to its competitiveness in today's global marketplace. Traditional procurement models in the operations management and supply chain management literature assume constant or known procurement prices. This might be true for companies having fixed price contracts with suppliers for the whole planning horizon, but such contracts always have certain provisions specifying the buyer's obligations. For instance, a forward contract might set a fixed procurement quantity, whereas a commitment contract might stipulate a minimum quantity to be purchased each time. On the other hand, the spot market provides a more flexible channel for procurement. For example, about 20% of DRAM chip purchases are made on the spot market (Nystedt 2007) ; spot sales account for up to 60% of iron ore trades in China in 2009 (Anonymous 2009 ); also, meat packers in the United States rely heavily on the spot market, which accounts for over 60% of physical supply for a large sample of packers (GIPSA 2007) . However, the lack of quantitative decision-support tools hinders many buyers from taking advantage of the dual sourcing possibilities.
This study aims to analyze a procurement model that incorporates both traditional contract procurement and spot market purchases. An example of our model is the procurement practice for iron ore. Starting in year 2010, contracts between major iron ore producers and Chinese steel makers have proceeded with a quarterly system, in which prices are decided by a three-month average of an index beginning four months before the relevant quarter (Lian and Stanway 2011) . Besides the long-term contract, iron producers can also adjust their ore inventories all year round by procuring from the more volatile spot market for ore.
In an attempt to shed light on the dual sourcing problem, we analyze a situation concerning a buyer who can source from both a contract supplier and a spot market. In each period, after fulfilling a minimum-order quantity commitment with the contract supplier, the buyer can make his additional procurement from both the supplier and the spot market. When he procures from the contract supplier, the buyer pays a predetermined per-unit cost that could be linked to the prevailing spot price; when 89 he procures from the spot market, the buyer has to pay a fixed setup cost on top of his payment on volatile spot prices. Such a setup cost might cover the fixed fee to enter the spot market, as well as activities like transportation, paperwork, brokerage, inspection, etc. However, those costs are negligible when procuring from the contract supplier. First, suppliers often provide certain consignment stock programs to help buyers save on these costs (see, e.g., http://www.tallymetal.com/tally3.html). Second, nonzero minimum-order quantity commitments will render any fixed cost a sunk portion affecting no operational decisions.
We let the spot market price follow a Markov process, whose realization is revealed to the buyer before each procurement. This simply means that, when predicting future price trends, past prices would not make any difference when the current price is available. The buyer is not allowed to sell his excess inventory back to the spot market. This is due to constraints associated with real-world purchasing practices, such as contractual agreements that restrict the buyer from reselling to the spot market or operational limitations, e.g., customized final form of the product supplied (think of microchips).
Our analysis reveals that one optimal policy consists of three different policy forms, the realization of each depending on the actual situation at hand. The buyer will certainly order from the contract supplier in a base-stock fashion when the contract price is below the prevailing spot price. When the contract supplier becomes more expensive, there are two scenarios. In one scenario, the buyer will source solely from the spot market in an s S fashion. In another scenario, the buyer will use one of the sources depending on his starting inventory level, with a lower level favoring the spot market. In addition, monotone trends in policy parameters have been found under reasonable conditions. Overall, we have arrived to definitive results on the important inventory problem dealing with two complementary sources. Our results suggest easily implementable inventory policies that react to spot prices in intuitive fashions. Methodologically, we contribute in the establishment of the K-convexity of a left-linear expansion of a given K-convex function. We have also established a pathway to simultaneously manage the K-and quasi-convexity properties that are responsible for, respectively, the s S and base-stock policy forms. A secondary contribution of ours lies in the identification of monotone trends for policy parameters in settings involving setup costs and Markovian price processes. Earlier monotone trends were all for policies of the base-stock type without the involvement of setup costs.
The remainder of the note is organized as follows. We review relevant literature in §2 and then present the model formulation in §3. Under mild assumptions, the shape of an optimal policy is derived in §4. We conclude the note with remarks in §5. All technical derivations have been relegated to appendices as well as online companions. In particular, monotone trends of policy parameters are presented in Online Companion E3. An electronic companion to this paper is available as part of the online version at http:// dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.1120.1114.
Literature Review
Within the inventory-control literature that also deals with spot markets, Fabian et al. (1959) , to the best of our knowledge, is the first to present a solution to determine raw material inventories when the price of the raw material fluctuates from period to period. Kalymon (1971) further studied an inventory model in which future purchasing prices form a Markov process and there is a setup cost for each procurement incident. Magirou (1982) treated a similar model in which the price process is Markovian and selling to the spot market is allowed.
The supplier in this note has another shield from the fluctuations of the spot market in the form of a variable unit price that is linked to the prevailing spot price. Such pricing contracts have been studied in Li and Kouvelis (1999) . As pointed out by Haksoz and Seshadri (2007) , the literature that incorporates spot market operations into long-term contract procurement is quite recent. Sethi et al. (2004) studied procurement using a quantity flexible contract in a spot market. The quantity flexible contract here is very similar to a call option. Feng and Sethi (2010) investigated optimal procurement and capacity allocation in the presence of a flexible contract and a spot market. Boyabatli et al. (2011) were concerned with optimizing the mix of contract and spot purchases to meet production requirements for multiple final markets. Yi and Scheller-Wolf (2003) is very relevant to our model. The authors analyzed a backlogged inventory problem in which the buyer can procure from both a capacitated contract supplier with a given unit ordering cost and a spot market with a given setup cost in addition to a random unit ordering cost. They showed that one optimal policy is similar to an s S one. However, their analysis does not apply to the case where unsatisfied demand is lost; also, without knowing cost functions' quasi-convexity, their policy with respect to the contract supplier is fairly complex. Fox et al. (2006) considered an inventory problem in which the buyer faces two supplier sources, one with a higher variable cost but no setup cost and another with both variable and setup costs. They proved that a simplified form of the generalized s S policy is optimal when the demand density function is log-concave. Ours extends this existing work to an environment with randomly fluctuating costs. In particular, we let the variable cost of one supply source be the uncertain spot price and allow the price paid to the other source to be dependent on the spot price. We are able to streamline our derivation through the use of a K-convexity preservation result concerning the left-linear expansion of a given function.
Moreover, we go further to identify sufficient conditions on the Markov spot price process, under which the policy parameters are monotone with respect to the spot price.
Operations Research 61(1), pp. 88-97, © 2013 INFORMS Yang and Xia (2009) studied a continuous-review acquisition problem and identified conditions under which policy parameters would be monotone in spot prices. A similar continuous-price problem was probed by Berling and Martinez-de-Albeniz (2011) . Several other papers are also related. Secomandi (2010) derived monotone properties for an optimal policy of a commodity trading problem with a capacitated storage facility.
Finally, some recent papers considered inventory control in the presence of commodity markets. Devalkar et al. (2011) studied a joint procurement-production problem in which the input is a commodity and the output is sold through multiple forward contracts. Optimal control policies were characterized when both procurement and production are constrained by capacities. Goel and Gutierrez (2011) used Lagrangian relaxation to approximately treat a problem involving both procurement at a single warehouse and distribution to multiple retailers. The study demonstrated the value of dynamically incorporating futures price information in complex procurement-distribution situations. Park et al. (2012) were concerned with two firms that both face stochastic demands and have options to procure through spot purchases as well futures contracts. The benefits of inventory sharing were shown to be linked to the commodity market's convenience yield. We note that none of the above works considered setup costs in spot purchases.
Model Formulation
Suppose a buyer manages his raw material inventory for an N -period horizon. We index periods in a backward fashion, i.e., period n starts when n periods remain before the end of the horizon. The buyer can replenish his inventory at the beginning of every period in anticipation of random demand that comes at the end of the period. Let us focus on period n. In this period, the buyer has to first order a predetermined minimum quantity Q n from the contract supplier. He can then freely use both sources. Suppose the realized period-n spot price is c. Then, for the quantity procured from the contract supplier, the buyer has to pay n c per unit, and when the buyer procures from the spot market, the spot price c is charged for every unit after a fixed setup cost K n has been paid. Such a fixed cost might include transportation, paperwork, and inspection costs, as well as brokerage commissions.
Demand levels over different periods are independent. In period n, the level is distributed with cumulative distribution function n and continuous probability density function n . Meanwhile, the spot price follows a Markov process. This implies the completeness of the spot market, in the sense that all information necessary for predicting future trends of the market is contained in the present price. We suppose the random period-n spot price c n has a support within the closed interval c n c n for constants c n andc n satisfying 0 c n c n . Let the discount factor per period be ∈ 0 1 . The sequence of events in each period is as follows. At the beginning of period n, the buyer first observes his on-hand inventory level x and the current spot price c. Then, after fulfilling the committed quantity Q n with the contract supplier, he decides on additional quantities to order from both sources. We assume both orders will arrive immediately, i.e., lead times for both supply sources are negligible. Next, demand is realized, and depending on its size, excess inventory is taken over to the next period costing the buyer h n per unit in holding, or unsatisfied demand is lost costing him p n per unit in shortage. At the end of the planning horizon, excess inventory is discarded without bringing in any salvage value. Note that even the singlesourcing lost sales inventory model is notoriously difficult when positive lead time is allowed; see, e.g., Zipkin (2008) . Therefore, we do not think it is straightforward to generalize current results to cases involving positive lead times.
Define f n x c to be the minimum expected discounted cost for the buyer to manage his inventory over periods n n − 1 1, starting with inventory level x 0 and spot price c ∈ c n c n . As mentioned earlier, f 0 x c = 0. To derive the recursive relationships among cost functions of neighboring periods, we first define the average inventory cost L n y , where
Recall that n is the probability density function for the period-n demand. Next we define the cost-to-go function G n−1 y c for y 0 and c ∈ c n c n by
This is the sum of the average inventory cost in the current period n and the optimal expected discounted cost over the next n − 1 periods. In (2), y stands for the post-order inventory level excluding the minimum quantity commitment Q n . Then the general dynamic equation governing the n-period problem can be written as
where J n x c = min
In (3), the first term is the purchase cost of the committed minimum-ordering quantity from the supplier, and the second term J n x c captures the rest of the cost. In (4), z = 1 if z > 0 and z = 0 otherwise. Also, u is the additional purchase quantity from the supplier, and v is the purchase quantity from the spot market.
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We can easily argue that it is never necessary to have both u > 0 and v > 0. Suppose this were indeed the case. We can differentiate between the first case where c n c and the second case where c < n c . For the first case where the spot market is more expensive, u v with u = u + v and v = 0 offers at least equally good solutions than u v . For the second case where the supplier is more expensive, u v with u = 0 and v = u + v offers a better solution. Therefore, after committing the minimum purchase quantity, the buyer has to procure from either the supplier or the spot market. The above (3) and (4) will become
where
and
Note that J H n x c corresponds to the case in which the buyer procures only from the contract supplier, while J L n x c corresponds to the case in which the buyer procures from the spot market after fulfilling the minimum quantity commitment with the supplier.
Optimal Inventory Policy
First, certain assumptions on our problem setting are needed to facilitate the later derivation. To describe the assumption on demand, we need the following notion. Definition 1. A distribution F is strongly unimodal if F is continuous and its density f is log-concave. That is, for any ∈ 0 1 ,
If a distribution function is strongly unimodal, then its convolution with a quasi-convex function remains to be quasi-convex (Dharmadhikari and Joag-dev 1988) . Throughout, we assume that the demand distribution is strongly unimodal. Most commonly encountered demand distributions belong to the class of strongly unimodal distributions; e.g., the normal, exponential, and uniform distributions. For cost parameters and the spot price process, we further introduce the following assumptions. Assumption 1. K n K n−1 for each n 1.
Assumption 2. h n sup c∈ c n c n E n−1 c n−1 c n = c − n c for each n 1. Assumption 3. p n sup c∈ c n c n n c for each n 1.
Assumption 1 specifies that setup costs concerning the spot market do not rise too fast over time. It is standard for K-convexity and the s S policy under nonstationary settings.
Assumption 2 says there is no speculative motive for the buyer to purchase from the supplier at an earlier time than needed. This requirement, taking the form h n + c n c n−1 when n c = c, often appears in the inventory control literature (Veinott 1966 , Gavirneni 2004 ) and the lot sizing literature (Atamtürk and Hochbaum 2001, Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi 2003) . Technically, it promulgates that prices charged by the supplier do not rise too fast over time. A reasonable supplier would ensure that such a price contract be in place, for otherwise the buyer would be tempted to burden her with huge acquisitions in the beginning and all but stopping dealing with her afterward.
We shall see momentarily from an example that even when n c = c, the assumption only asks the expected upward movement of the price process to be moderate in comparison with the buyer's investment return rate. More likely, a contract form in which n c increases in c but at a rate below one would prevail. For the buyer, it has the benefit of shielding him from the excesses of the spot market. For the supplier, it gives her more wherewithal room to smooth out the demand stream. To see the latter point, suppose for some ∈ 0 1 ,
Then Assumption 2 would require only E c n−1 c n = c − c h n / , which is "1/ times" milder than E c n−1 c n =c − c h n . Assumption 3 is reasonable for our lost sales system. In it, the penalty of a lost order should, after all, include the lost of good will on top of the sales price of the product unit. Because n c is what the supplier will charge the buyer for a unit product, it serves as a lower-end proxy for the product's sales price.
Here is a concrete example that helps justify Assumptions 2 and 3. The spot price process c n n = N N − 1 1 might follow the Cox-Ross-Rubenstein (CRR) discrete approximation of a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) with trend parameter , volatility parameter , and initial price c N ; see Online Companion E1. At the same time, for constants n ∈ 0 1 and n ¯ n satisfying n ¯ n ⊂ c n c n , one special form for n c is
This is the risk-sharing contract considered by Li and Kouvelis (1999) . The contract price will change in a more moderate fashion than the spot price. It will be above, equal to, and below the spot price, depending on whether the latter is extremely low, mild, or extremely high. The fixed price contract mentioned in §1 is clearly a special case of (9). Under the aforementioned price process and the contract form n c = c, Assumption 2 will be guaranteed when Under the buyer's investment return rate r per-unit time, note = 1/ 1 + r 1/N and
The above (10) is roughly about r, that the GBM trend factor for the spot price process be below the buyer's investment return rate. Because is the average growth rate of the GBM price process, (10) requires that the average price growth rate be below the buyer's investment return rate. If this were not true, the buyer's dealing with the raw material spot market would not be sustainable in the long run.
Meanwhile, a special case of (9) is when all the n s are equal to the same "moderation factor" and for each n, both n and¯ n are equal to the same "anchor point" n :
Note that reflects the "portion of the wrath" that the buyer would feel from the spot market. When the anchor points of the price contract do not rise too fast, in the sense that
we would have (8), and then the requirement on the price process would become even milder. Finally, Assumption 3 is unrelated to the price process and under the more general (9), it amounts to the requirement of
Now we come to the derivation, to which two notions are pertinent. Here and afterward, stands for the real line.
Definition 2. A function g x is quasi-convex if for any x y ∈ and ∈ 0 1 ,
Definition 3. A function g x is K-convex if for any x y and ∈ 0 1 ,
The following technical lemma concerns the preservation of K-convexity when a function undergoes a certain leftlinear expansion. We believe this result is of some interest in its own right, because there is potential for it to be applied to other situations. Lemma 1. Suppose f x is K-convex on some interval a b , where b might well be + . For constants and d, where d < a might well be − , suppose g x is defined by
Also, let k be the maximum value among the optimal points of min
The proof of the lemma is provided in Appendix A. Now we start to derive an optimal policy. Concerning procurement from the supplier, the quasi-convexity of n c y + G n−1 y c will later be established by Theorem 1. We may define
which is the largest minimizer of the unconstrained version of the optimization problem (6). Concerning purchase from the spot market, the K n -convexity of G n−1 y c will be established by Theorem 1. We may define
which is a minimizer to the unconstrained version of the optimization problem (7) when the K n -related term is ignored, and
which is a breakeven point associated with the optimization problem (7). The above c-dependent points will be the parameters that define an optimal policy, with S H n c defining order-up-to levels with the contract supplier, and s L n c and S L n c serving as reorder and order-up-to levels with the spot market, respectively.
Intuitively, we can imagine that when c n c , the buyer should procure from the contract supplier by adopting a general base-stock policy. When c < n c , however, the buyer should trade off between the cost saved by procuring at a lower spot price and the setup cost K n saved by procuring from the contract supplier. Thus, for c < n c , we further define the following level:
Here, s O n c is a threshold for the starting inventory level at which there is no cost difference between procurements from the contract supplier and that from the spot market. When c < n c and the initial inventory level is s We have the following theorem concerning an optimal inventory policy. Theorem 1. For n = 1 2 N , G n−1 y c is K n -convex in y and f n x c is K n -convex in x; n c y + G n−1 y c is quasi-convex in y; in addition, S L n c S H n c when c < n c , and one optimal inventory policy is as follows:
(a) if c n c or s O n c 0, the buyer procures from the contract supplier using a base-stock policy with orderup-to level S Theorem 1 has demonstrated three policy forms the buyer can resort to in different circumstances. When the contract price is below the prevailing spot price, he should order from the contract supplier as indicated by (a). When the contract supplier becomes more expensive, there are two scenarios, (b) and (c). In (b), the buyer should source exclusively from the spot market in an s S fashion; whereas in (c), he should use one of the two sources depending on his starting inventory level-he will favor the spot market when the level is below s O n c and the contract supplier otherwise.
The theorem has gone further than the corresponding result in Fox et al. (2006) by specifying when each of the three policy forms will be triggered. Our proof bears some similarity to that for the earlier result, especially in the part on identifying policy forms. However, we are not limited to the case where c n = c L < n c = c H for given constants c L and c H . For both proofs, the main difficulty lies in showing the preservation of K-convexity for cost functions under various transformations. Whereas Fox et al. resorted to many case-specific arguments, we have summarized our main tools into Lemma 1. In multiple occasions, we used the special version of the lemma involving a c-rate extension to − a where c f x x→a + . But in the most challenging part concerning case (c) in Theorem 1, we enlisted the general version of the lemma.
Our proof of Theorem 1, especially the portion most pertinent to the quasi-convexity property, relies very much on Assumption 2; see Appendix B. We can use a computational study to decide how essential this assumption is and how robust Theorem 1 is. Our findings are twofold. On one hand, when this assumption is mildly violated, quasi-convexity would remain intact. This indicates the robustness of our result. On the other hand, there are incidences where quasi-convexity is violated just due to the lack of Assumption 2. This highlights the indispensability of this assumption to our derivation. The study indicates Assumption 3 is important, too, although probably not as much as Assumption 2. Details about the study are presented in Online Companion E2.
We can establish monotone trends for policy parameters s L n c and S L n c when the Markovian spot price process satisfies certain conditions. Furthermore, when the contract price n c degenerates to a constant price, say c H n , we can establish trends for S H n c and s O n c as well. These trends together will allow price intervals to be defined, so that a procurement manager can decide on which one of the three policy forms to take by identifying the interval the current spot price has fallen into. Details to these results can be found in Online Companion E3.
Finally, we mention in passing that numerical experiments aimed at comparative statics trends have been carried out. In them, the supplier's contract follows the risk-sharing form of (9), and the spot price process forms a CRR discrete approximation of a GBM. Besides the buyer's obvious preference for lower commitment procurement quantities, lower contract prices, and lower drifts of spot price processes, we have observed other interesting phenomena and trends. However, no general conclusion can be drawn at this stage. For conciseness, we have opted to leave details of these experiments out of this note.
Concluding Remarks
We have considered a stochastic inventory problem in which procurement can be made with both a long-term contract supplier and a spot market wherein prices follow a Markov process. The supplier has partial protection from the fluctuations of the spot market in the forms of minimum-order commitments and spot-dependent contract prices. Under Assumptions 1 to 3 that boil down to slow potential contract price increases over time and high lost-sales penalty requirements in stationary settings, we proved that a policy consisting of three price-dependent pieces is optimal for the buyer to minimize its discounted total expected cost. Monotone trends for policy parameters may be identified when the contract price reacts mildly to the spot price and the price process satisfies certain timecontinuity and negative-drifting conditions (Assumptions 4 to 6 in Online Companion E3).
More extensions of this research can be made. One is the consideration of both a minimum commit quantity and a maximum capacity for the buyer to procure from the supplier in each period. This is important as knowing that the buyer will take advantage of the spot market and the long-term contracts, the supplier may set lower and upper bounds on the buyer's ability to "exploit" her. Because the single-sourcing inventory problem involving 
By the definition of k , we have
which leads to (A1) because K 0. Let us consider the case where k > a. Note that is required to satisfy
We may combine (A2) and (A3) to obtain
When restricted to a b , g x is K-convex just because g x = f x and f x is K-convex on a b . When restricted to d a , g x is linear and hence K-convex, too. Thus, to show the Kconvexity of g x on d b = d a ∪ a b , we have only to show, for any x and y satisfying d x < a < y b,
First, by the definition of g x and the respective ranges of x and y, we have
Then we consider two cases. If x + 1 − y ∈ d a , we have
where the last equality is due to (A4), while the last inequality is due to (A1) as well as the facts that 1 and y > a. If x + 1 − y ∈ a b , however, we have
Also, note that
Now we have
where the second equality is due to (A6), the ensuing inequality is due to the K-convexity of f x and (A5), the last equality is due to (A4), and the last inequality is due to (A1) as well as the facts that 0 and x < a. Thus, the general result is obtained. Suppose f x x→a + has been given. When k = a, it is automatically true that g x is K-convex on d b . Let us consider the case where k > a. Now for any x ∈ 0 k − a , we have, by the K-convexity of f x on a b ,
After rearranging terms, the above becomes
B. Proof of Theorem 1
We pretend in notation that partial derivatives exist for all functions in our model, e.g., f n x c and G n−1 y c . This is made for simplicity and is based on the fact that points without derivatives constitute a set with zero Lebesgue measure. At those points, derivatives are taken to be the minimum of the right and left derivatives, which always exist. For an arbitrary function g x y with two variables, we adopt the following notation:
g 2 x y = g x y y Besides Lemma 1, three more lemmas are needed. Lemma B1 is about the preservation of K-convexity, whereas Lemmas B2 and B3 are concerned with policy structures for single-period optimization problems involving J H n x c and J L n x c , respectively. Lemma B1. Suppose f n−1 x c is K n−1 -convex in x and f 1 n−1 x c − n−1 c for x ∈ 0 + . Then, G n−1 y c as defined in (2) is K n -convex for y ∈ .
Proof. Define q n−1 z c and r n−1 z c so that
and r n−1 z c = h n z
With (1) and (2), note that
Now by (B1) and Assumption 1, we see that q n−1 z c is K n−1 -and hence K n -convex with respect to z and q 1 n−1 z c − E n−1 c n−1 c n = c for z ∈ 0 + , just because of the lemma's hypothesis that f n−1 x c is K n−1 -convex with respect to x and f 1 n−1 x c − n−1 c for x ∈ 0 + . From (B2), we can see that
Thus, as a function of z, r n−1 z c is continuous on the real line , K n -convex on 0 + , and decreasing on − 0 . Combining Assumptions 2 and 3, we obtain Hence, we see that r n−1 z c satisfies the condition of Lemma 1, which ensures that r n−1 z c is K n -convex in z on the entire real line . By (B3), so is G n−1 y c in y.
Lemma B2. Suppose f n−1 x c satisfies f 1 n−1 x c − n−1 c for x ∈ 0 + . Then, the function n c y + G n−1 y c is quasi-convex in y, and the single-period problem concerning J H n x c defined in (6) has a base-stock policy with orderup-to level S 
where r n−1 z c is given in (B2). We may define˜ n · on −Q n + so that˜ n = n + Q n . Then, (B3) will lead to n c y + G n−1 y c
Now as f 1 n−1 x c − n−1 c for x ∈ 0 + , we get from (B1) that q 1 n−1 z c − E n−1 c n−1 c n = c for z 0. By (B2), we have m n−1 z c = h n + n c z + q n−1 z c for z 0
Thus, as a function of z, m n−1 z c is continuous on , increasing on 0 + due to Assumption 2, and decreasing on − 0 due to Assumption 3. It is therefore quasi-convex in z with its minimum reached at z = 0.
By this, (B6), and the fact that the demand distribution is strongly unimodal with a positive support, we can establish that n c y + G n−1 y c is quasi-convex in y. Therefore, we can define S H n c as in (12), so that one optimal policy for the problem revolving around J Proof. By Lemma B1, we know that G n−1 y c is K n -convex in y. Hence so is cy + G n−1 y c in y. Thus, points S L n c and s L n c as defined in (13) and (14) Let us now complete the theorem's proof by inductively confirming the satisfaction of the following two properties for all periods:
(i) f n x c is K n -convex with respect to x on 0 + ; (ii) f n x c is continuous in x on 0 + and f 1 n x c − n c . These two properties obviously hold when n = 0 because f 0 x c 0 = 0. Then, suppose they hold for f n−1 x c for some n = 1 2
We concentrate on f n x c now. Recall that by (5), (6), and (7), we have
where J H n x c is as defined in (6) and J L n x c is as defined in (7), whereas the involved G n−1 y c is as defined in (2).
When c n c , it is obvious that the buyer should procure from the contract supplier. Thus, f n x c = J H n x c . So by Lemma B2, we know that f n x c is K n -convex in x and f H n c , we know that Z n x c is K nconvex by Lemma 1. Because c < n c , the largest minimum point of cx +Z n x c is the same as that for cx +G n−1 x c . That is, it is S L n c , which is greater than S H n c by Lemma B3. By (B9), we can view f n x c as a left-linear expansion of function Z n x c with slope −c. In view of (15) 
n c is the largest minimum point of cx + Z n x c . Thus, we have the K n -convexity of f n x c by Lemma 1.
We have thus shown that (i) and (ii) will hold for f n x c . That f n x c is continuous is straightforward to verify. Therefore, one optimal policy is as indicated by the theorem.
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From the above, we see that this example satisfies
when the initial price c N is given.
E2. A Numerical Illustration:
We carry out a numerical test to understand the significance of Assumptions 2 and 3 to the preservation of our main result, Theorem 1. In the test, we fix the number of periods N = 5. From the formulation (5) to (7), it is clear that the valuation of Q would not affect the structure of cost-to-go functions. Hence, we let the order quantity commitment for all periods be Q = 0. We let all other parameters be stationary as well. It is clear that Assumption 1 is now non-binding. Following (11), we take the simple supplier contract form
which involves parameters β and γ. In addition, we let the price process form a CRR approximation of a GBM, and let demand in every period be a discrete approximation of the truncated Normal random variable.
Each test instance is defined by the following ensemble of parameters:
α: the per-period discount factor; For each instance (α, β, γ, K, h, p, µ, σ, c N 
, we can define two measures v 2 and v 3 as follows: (32), and
From (31) and (32), we may see that there are n price varieties in each period N −n+1 for n = 1, 2, ..., N . In each such period, for m = 0, 1, ..., n − 1, each price c N e
would occur with probability C
Hence, from the definitions of the two assumptions 2 and 3, as well as (31) to (33) For each instance, we can use brute-force dynamic programming (DP) through formulations (5) to (7) to compute the minimum total discounted average costs f n (x, c) for
and c ∈ [c n , c n ], where x = 1, 000 is pre-specified and c n and c n are as provided by (33).
When the DP needs the value of f n+1 (x, c) at some x ≥ x+1 while computing f n (x, c) within the aforementioned range, we use linear extrapolation to approximate this f n+1 (x, c) value.
At the same time, we can devise a policy-iteration heuristic which uses the policy structure depicted in Theorem 1 without regard to whether cost functions are well structured as well.
In it, we still use backward induction. In each iteration, we employ (12) to (15) to compute policy parameters and then to construct the cost function for a new period. Let the total discounted average cost from this heuristic be denoted byf n (x, c). We can define the relative performance error resulting from blindly believing in Theorem 1's policy structure by
According to the theorem, the error would be 0 when Assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied.
Otherwise, the cost function might not enjoy the convexity properties and the optimal policy implied by the true optimal cost function f n (x, c) might not have the structure predicted by the theorem. This would lead to a positive error η.
As Assumptions 2 and 3 are mainly responsible for the quasi-convexity of κ(c)x + G n−1 (x, c) in Theorem 1, we also define a measure on the violation of this property:
is the combinatorial number defined in the above, and
The thus defined v qc is a normalized measure on κ(c)x We take instance samples (α, β, γ, K, h, p, µ, σ, c N In Figure 1 , we plot the (v 2 , η) and (v 2 , v qc ) correspondences for the first 10,000 samples that satisfy v 3 = 0; whereas, in Figure 2 , we plot the (v 2 , v 3 , v qc ) correspondences for the first 10,000 samples. More than the theorem, we see that quasi-convexity can be maintained until the onset of very major violations of Assumption 2: Figure 1 says that the first instance with η > 0 and v qc > 0 won't occur unless v 2 > 4.37% ; also, the violation is very minor, with η ≃ 0.0069%
and v qc ≃ 4.39%. On the other hand, the fact that a large enough v 2 does occasionally lead to η > 0 and v qc > 0 means that Assumption 2, or at least one of its weaker versions, is needed for the proof of Theorem 1. We count 73 violations in Figure 1 and 98 violations in Figure 2 . This reflects that Assumption 3 does play a role, albeit minor, in the preservation of quasi-convexity.
We also observe two other interesting phenomena. One is that v 3 > 0 alone would not render v qc > 0. This in a sense means that Assumption 2 is more critical to the validity of Theorem 1 than Assumption 3. Another is that K-convexity is never found to be violated in any of the tested problem instances. This latter point should be clear from the theorem's proof around (25) and (28): the two assumptions are directly used for the preservation of quasi-convexity rather than K-convexity. However, K-convexity could be violated when the h and p parameters become time-varying. This is because K-convexity is linked to quasiconvexity, and hence indirectly linked to the two assumptions.
E3. Derivation for Monotone Properties:
From Section 4, we know that one optimal inventory policy is made up of three separate forms. Here, we are interested in how the choice of these three forms and parameters within these forms depend on the realized spot price in each period. We first explore monotone properties of s Then, by applying these monotone properties, we identify three price intervals, within each of which a specific inventory policy form is optimal.
First, we suppose that the contract price increases with the spot price in a mild fashion.
The contract price given in (9) Next, we suppose prices of two consecutive periods satisfy the following:
Here, E n (c) and Σ n (c) stand for, respectively, the mean and standard deviation of the spot price in period n − 1 when given c as the realized spot price in period n, and
is a c n -independent random variable with mean zero, variance one, and support within [−A n , B n ] for positive constants A n and B n satisfying
We may denote ε n 's cumulative distribution function by Ψ n (ε) and its continuous probability density function by ψ n (ε). This form of price process covers the discrete-time approximation of the Geometric Brownian Motion (see Gibson and Schwartz 1990 and Schwartz 1997) .
By the definition of ψ n (·) and the zero-mean property of ε n , we have
ψ n (ε)dε = 1, and
Note that we have the following relationship between the cumulative distribution function
We now make two assumptions on E n (c) and Σ n (c), which will be shown to be sufficient for policy parameters to have monotone trends with respect to the spot price. 
Thus, following c ≥ c and Assumption 5, we have
Then, ξ ≥ ξ, which leads to
That is, Θ n−1|n (c ′ | c) is decreasing in c at a fixed c ′ . This means that c n−1 is stochastically increasing in c n .
Assumption 6 indicates that the change in the expected discounted price for the next period, induced by the current price change, is less than that of the current price.
Both assumptions are easily satisfied for the CRR approximation of GBM as described in Online Companion E1. From (31) and (32), we can see that the process is with n-independent E n (·), Σ n (·), and ε n , where
and ε n is discrete, with there being a p U chance for it to be Thus, we have
Therefore, Assumption 5 will always be satisfied, and Assumption 6 will be satisfied when
essentially requiring that there be enough downward drift in the underlying Brownian motion relative to its volatility when discounting is only mild. When µ is at its maximum allowable value, note that
As long as the per-period discount α is reasonably small in comparison to the per-period volatility σ √ 1/N , we do not need E n (c) < c to ensure the validity of Assumption 6. For instance, when σ/ √ N = 0.05, we can have both Assumption 6 and E n (c) > c whenever α < 0.96. Now for function g(x, y), we adopt the notation
The following lemma describes the interplay between the initial inventory level and the spot price.
Theorem 2 For x ≥ 0, f n (x, c) is increasing in c and f
n (x, c) ≥ −1.
This theorem has an immediate interpretation: the marginal value of the initial on-hand inventory increases in the spot price, but at a sub-unit rate. With the aid of Theorem 2, we can obtain the following result concerning monotone properties. that the contract supplier will more likely be used when the current spot price is higher. All these are intuitive trends.
Theorem 3 Policy parameters
In the remainder of this section, we concentrate on the case where κ n (c) = c H n for every n and c ∈ [c n , c n ]. This is a further specialization of the form (9). For this case, let us define two threshold prices as follows:
with the understanding that c
From (12) and (13), we may see that
Due to (15), this leads to 
policy to procure from the spot market is optimal;
The opposite case, due to its lack of the interval corresponding to Theorem 4(c), can be more easily depicted. In essence, we can divide the spot-price space [c n , c n ] into no more than three regions, with each of which seeing the dominance of one of the three policy forms. Finally, we offer proofs of those theorems established in this section.
Proof of Theorem 2:
First, note that G n−1 (y, c) defined in (2) can be written as
Next, we may prove by induction. As f 0 (x, c) = 0, the result obviously holds for n = 0.
Assuming that it also holds for n − 1 for some n = 1, 2, ..., let us prove the result for n.
We work out the case where the (s
H n (c)) policy is used in period n. The proof procedures for the other two cases are similar and actually simpler.
By (12), we have
Also note that (30) in Appendix B provides the form for f n (x, c). Thus, taking derivative with c as well as noting (29) in Appendix B and (38), we have
Plugging (37) into the above, we have f
n−1 ((S L n (c) + Q n − ξ) + , E n (c) + Σ n (c)ε)dξdε, otherwise.
Because f 
n (x, c) ≤ 0.
Thus, the results also hold for n. So, we can conclude that the results hold for all n. ⋄
Proof of Theorem 3:
We first prove a useful lemma. Proof: Suppose to the contrary, S 1 < S 2 . Then,
Lemma A4
But by definitions of S 1 and S 2 , the first term is positive and the last term is non-positive.
Therefore, a contradiction arises, and the lemma holds true. ⋄ To prove the theorem, let c 1 ≥ c 2 . We prove this result when an (s 
n−1 (y + Q n − ξ, E n (c 2 ) + Σ n (c 2 )ε)]dξdε.
For each ε, the fact that c 1 ≥ c 2 and Assumption 1 will lead to
Combining this with the mean value theorem and Theorem 2, we have, for each ξ ≤ y + Q n , f
n−1 (y + Q n − ξ, E n (c 1 ) + Σ n (c 1 )ε) − f
n−1 (y + Q n − ξ, E n (c 2 ) + Σ n (c 2 )ε)
Combining (34), (39) and (40), we obtain
where the second inequality is by the fact that 0 ≤ Φ n (y + Q n ) ≤ 1 and Assumption 5, and the last inequality is by Assumption 6. Then, we have S (ii) To explore the monotone property of s L n (c), we first prove
If (41) were not true, cx + G n−1 (x, c) would be strictly increasing in x at the point s 
In (42), note that by (37),
By Theorem 2, we have, for each ξ and ε, f
n−1 ((s Taking derivative over y and noting (37), we have
n−1 (y + Q n − ξ, E n (c 2 ) + Σ n (c 2 )ε)]dξdε, which is non-positive when κ n (·) = c
